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DENVER, MARCH, 1928

Special Notice to Members
February 28, 1928
The members of The Denver Bar Association are
hereby respectfully notified as follows:
The president, pursuant to Section 3 of Article 7
of the by-laws of this Association, on the 28th day of
February, A. D. 1928, appointed a Nominating Committee, consisting of the following five members of
this Association:
William E. Hutton, Chairman
Charles C. Butler
Wilbur F. Denious
A. L. Doud
James A. Marsh
The Nominating Committee above mentioned will
in due course nominate a President, a First VicePresident, a Second Vice-President and two Trustees
to be voted upon at the annual meeting of this Association, which will take place April 30, 1928.
In accordance with Section 3 of Article 7 of the
by-laws, the members of the Association are hereby
invited to send to the Secretary the names of such'
persons as they may desire to propose for the consideration of this Committee.
Respectfully submitted
(Signed) Albert J. Gould, Jr.
Sec'y of The Denver Bar Ass'n
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Annual Banquet
in attendance at the annual banBOUT two hundred persons were
quet of the Denver Bar Association on the night of Washington's
birthday at the University Club. The
guest of the occasion was the Honorable Silas H. Strawn of Chicago, President of the American Bar Association,
in whose honor the program was printed in a miniature facsimile of the
American Bar Association Journal, displaying on the title page the names of
the number of local members of the
profession as sponsoring certain imaginary but supposedly appropriate legal
articles.
Party Harmony
An entertaining musical program
had been arranged by Mr. Edward G.
Knowles of the committee, with the cooperation of Mr. Oliver Gushee at the

piano and the assistance of about twenty members of the association in the
role of a chorus. Messrs. Knowles, Aldrich, Ben Sweet, and Chas. White
rendered selections from well-known
popular airs rewritten in parody upon
subjects of current interest, the Law
School situation and judicial salaries.
Mr. Knowles' rendition of an imaginary ballad by Mayor Thompson of
Chicago, sung to the tune of "Side by
Side", was particularly well-received.
Chorus
"Well, as long as I'm Mayor of Chicargo
I'm gonna declare an Embargo
On the British Control of our National
SoulIt's a shame!
I don't like foreign-born Crownedheads-
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I'm Cromwell of Uncle Sam's RoundheadsRidin' my Nag, Chewin' the RagBill's my name."
Mr. White (without his kilts) gave a
series of humorous Scotch imitations
which were greeted with great applause. One of the high spots of the
musical entertainment was a series of
songs by the Melodian Trio then appearing with the American Legion
Revue.
Upon the conclusion of the dinner
Mr. Stearns, the president of the association called upon Mr. Roger Wolcott, the toastmaster of the occasion.
The latter in a brief and well-chosen
manner introduced Mr. James Grafton
Rogers who responded with an address
upon "The Changing Career of the
Lawyer".
The Lawyer and the Bellhop
Mr. Rogers drew. an interesting picture of the changed and changing aspects of American civilization and suggested a concurrent change in the aspect of the legal profession to meet the
altered demands of that civilization
upon it.
He professed to find evidence of
such change in the changing types of
the leaders of the profession as exemplified by the different presidents of
the American Bar Association.
In an interesting fashion he discussed the career and qualifications of
Mr. Broadhead of Missouri, the first
president of the association, his services in the War for the Union and his
professional attainments, stressing the
political aspect of Mr. Broadhead's
career. From this as a starting point
he had reference to Mr. David Dudley
Field, Mr. Elihu Root, and the Honored Guest of the evening, Mr. Strawn.
In the course of the evolution of the
character of the incumbents of the
presidential office, Mr. Rogers sensed
a trend from the political man of the
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era of 1876 to the type of specialization and broad business background
which has been exemplified in the
presidents of the latter years.
In a figure of speech Mr. Rogers depicted the present attorney as a sort
of a bellboy of modern civilization carrying a few things each from one room
or another in the cosmic layout and
staying no great while in any one.
The speaker referred to his own very
pleasant association with Mr. Strawn
in the official activities of the national
association and made complimentary
reference to the latter's illustrious attainments.
In introducing Mr. Strawn, Mr. Wolcott, as Mr. Rogers had before him,
made reference to the official visit of
that gentleman as the representative
of the United States Government to
China and also to other positions of
great public and national importance
which he had held.
Mr. Strawn was then called upon
and, after disclaiming in the urbane
manner which marked his whole utterance, the enconiums which the toastmaster had put upon him, discoursed
felicitously upon "The American Bar
Association". Referring to a remark
of the toastmaster's he narrated the
anecdote wherein the returned native
of a midwestern state regales his saloon
comrades with an account of the glorious sights of California when, upon
being accosted by the ubiquitous inebriate, with the query as to whether
the traveler has ever had delirium
tremens, is, upon responding in the
negative, told:
"You ain't been no
place, and you ain't seen nuthin!"
Close the Open Bar
Referring to the legal educational
policy of the American Bar Association, with which he has for a number
of years been peculiarly associated, Mr.
Strawn very vigorously defended his
own tenets and those of his organiza-
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tion as properly demanding high academic requirements as a prerequisite
for admission to the Bar. Mr. Strawn
defended such a policy not only in
point of theory but also by reference
to instances within his own experience.
He concurred in the view of Mr.
Rogers with reference to the intensive
growth of legal specialization and the
increasing importance of legal education through law schools as necessitated by that condition. He paid a
compliment to the toastmaster and Mr.
Rogers in their capacity of professional
men who had dedicated themselves to
educational work.
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He referred with great complacency
to the enlightened and prosperous economic condition of this country in comparison with other nations of the world
which had come within his personal
observation and attributed its favorable aspects, in part at least, to the
basic beneficence of a favorable form
of government.
He addressed an appeal to the members of the Bar to remain steadfast in
their support of American Constitutional polity.
In conclusion he recalled (not uninterruptedly) and delivered the inspiring lines of the two odes on "Opportunity".

The Capper Resolution
(Correspondence Between Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler and Mr.
Hans H. Wolff, Civil Engineer of Denver, an
Alumnus of Columbia University.)
Editorial Note: A large number of the
members of the Denver Bar had the privilege of hearing one or both of the addresses recently delivered here by Dr.
Nicholas lurray Butler. Because of the
legal and international aspects of the
Capper Resolution, the correspondence
herewith published should prove of interest.
1515 East Ninth Ave.
Denver, Colorado,
December 17, 1927.
Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler,
President, Columbia University,
New York, N. Y.
My dear Dr. Butler:It was my privilege to hear the extremely interesting addresses which
you delivered under the auspices of
the Foundation for the Advancement
of the Social Sciences of the University of Denver at the luncheon in the
*Cosmopolitan Hotel and at the Denver
Auditorium on December 12th.
In both of these addresses you called upon the audience to use their in-

fluence with their Senators and Representatives in Congress toward the
passage of the so-called Capper resolution of which copies were furnished.
I feel that I have a very clear understanding of what you said, of what
the resolution involves, and of what
will be the consequences of our entering into the proposed compacts.
Yet in discussing these matters with
others I find that they have taken a
very different meaning, and it is for
the purpose of securing an authoritative interpretation, which I may present and publicly cite, that I take this
liberty of writing to you for certain
specific information of importance. I
am sure that you feel with me that so
momentous a change in policy as the
step proposed should be undertaken
only with eyes open and as clear an
estimate as possible of what we may
be called upon to face.
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The Capper resolution reads as follows:
"Resolved by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled,
That it be declared to be the policy of
the United States:
"I.
By treaty with France and other
like-minded nations formally to renounce war as an instrument of public policy and to adjust and settle its
international disputes by mediation,
arbitration and conciliation; and
By formal declaration to accept
"II.
the definition of aggressor nation as
one which, having agreed to submit
international differences to conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement,
begins hostilities without having done
so; and
"Ill. By treaty with France and other
like-minded nations to declare that the
nationals of the contracting governments should not be protected by their
governments in giving aid and comfort to an aggressor nation; and
"Ba it further resolved, That the President be requested to enter into negotiations with France and other likeminded nations for the purpose of
concluding treaties with such nations,
in furtheranc3 of the declared policy
of the United States."
"To adjust and settle its international
disputes by mediation, arbitration and
conciliation."
No exceptions. You emphasized that
there are to be no exceptions because
to allow any would means to allow
every question to be excepted and render the pact meaningless. Any nation
may, therefore, begin a dispute on any
subject and it must be settled by arbitration if insisted upon. To this the
Furcontracting parties are bound.
thermore, the nation which declines
arbitration, not the one which causes
the dispute, becomes the aggressor if
war ensues.
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The five countries with which it is
proposed to enter into such compacts
are France, Great Britain, Germany,
Italy and Japan. At the present time
there is no question of major importance in which the United States
wants anything from any one of these
countries. One or more of these countries do, however, object to one or
more of the following: the debt settlements, our tariff, the Monroe Doctrine,
prohibition, our immigration laws.
All of these subjects are international questions since all of them have
been internationally disputed. Let us
take some hypothetical, but entirely
Assuming that we
possible, cases.
have entered into the proposed compacts with the five nations, that Japan
objects to our exclusion law as applied
to herself on the ground that it is insulting, discriminatory and a possible
cause of war, that Japan demands a
change in that law and, conciliation
and negotiation having failed, insists
upon arbitration or judicial decision.
Similarly, suppose France and subsequently, Germany, Italy and Great
Britain express dissatisfaction with
the debt settlements and demand that
this question be reopened and left to
suppose
international adjudication,
that one or more of the five nations
object on economic grounds to the exclusion of their wines and that strained relations develop similar to those
that were brought about by similar
circumstances not so long ago betwPen
Norway and Portugal, suppose our
tariff again arouse antagonism as it
has so frequently done in the past,
and, perhaps, above all, suppose our
Monroe Doctrine is again challenged
in a manner that we believe will jeopardize our national security, as for
instance through the colonization by
one of the five nations of a large tract
of land with a good harbor in a neighboring country close to our border,
such as was indeed at one time re-
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ported to have been attempted and to
have been prevented only by the potential and implied threat of war.
Under such circumstances are we or
are we not, under paragraph I, by
treaty, in honor and morally bound to
submit to arbitration and to abide by
the award? If we decline arbitration,
are we or are we not, under paragraph
II, the aggressor nation and, if so, subject to the penalty provided under
paragraph III?
I can see no alternative to a categorical yes in answer to each of these
If my interpretation is
questions.
correct, are you and are others of your
point of view willing to risk the consequences of the decisions rendered
by foreign arbiters upon questions of
such supreme importance to our country?
I am, my dear Sir,
Very truly yours,
(Signed) H. H. WOLFF.
HHW/M

NIcHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER
BROADWAY AT 116TH STREET
NEW YORK CITY
December 22, 1927.
H. H. Wolff, Esq.
1515 East 9th Avenue,
Denver, Colorado.
My dear Mr. Wolff:
I am very much interested in your
careful letter of December 17 and
thank you for writing me. The conversations which you report reflect
just the sort of misunderstanding with
which we have to deal in trying to
make any progress in our international
relations.
It has never been proposed by anyone that matters of the internal policy
of any nation should be treated as subJect to international arbitrament. A
nation's immigration laws are its own,
as are a nation's tariff duties. No civilized people would think of asking
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another nation to submit such questions as those to international arbitrament. Japan may feel, and does
feel, aggrieved at our exclusion cf its
people, but it would never enter the
head of Japan to ask that the exclusion act passed by Congress be made
the subject of arbitration or judicial
determination at Geneva or at The
Hague. The same is true of such internal questions as tariff duties, rates
of taxation, and the like. Great Britain,
for example, imposes an income tax on
any foreigner, including Americans,
who spends more than six months out
of twelve in that country. Such a law
may or may not seem fair, but it is a
domestic British law and that ends it.
Our great grandfathers made a strong
fight against taxation without representation, but that very principle is
now embodied firmly in our legislation,
both Federal and State. No man can
escape paying an income tax on the
plea that he has not the right to vote.
The debt settlements, on the other
hand, are international and have been
so considered by us from the beginning. They will, one of these days, be
readjusted and settled, amicably I feel
sure, by methods of diplomatic discussion and perhaps by conciliation.
The Monroe Doctrine is in a peculiar
situation, since it is not a domestic
policy and has never been accepted as
international law. It gives no particular offence in Europe, while it gives
great offence in Latin America. In
the United States it has been expressed in so many different forms that no
one can be sure as to what it really
means. In the form in which it was
stated by President Monroe it gives
no offence and raises no objection anywhere. It is the extensions and applications of the doctrine in the last
thirty years that have aroused antagonism in Latin America and brought
down ill feeling upon us. Yet the Monroe Doctrine is expressly exempted
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from international determination by
the statute establishing the League of
Nations and therefore would lie outside the scope of any agreement for
international arbitration.
When anyone asks us these questions, he must always be prepared to
confront the alternative. Suppose, for
example, that he is not ready and willing to try to settle any or all of these
questions as they arise peaceably.
Then do we understand that he is prepared to go to war about it? If the
reply is Yes, then let it be made frankly and we all understand each other.
Thanking you for your letter, and
with all the compliments of the season, I am,
Faithfully yours,
(Signed) NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER.

Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler,
Broadway at 116th Street,
New York, N. Y.
My dear Dr. Butler:I thank you for your kind letter of
December 22nd, in reply to my letter
of inquiry.
In your last paragraph you issue a
challenge that anyone asking the questions which I have asked, state his
position frankly.
I do so gladly. It is this: That we
study carefully every serious proposal
for the betterment of international
relations and the avoidance of war,
but that we do this impartially in
order to ascertain latent dangers as
well as seeming benefits and that we
require the latter safely to outweigh
the former. If this is not the case,
that we then discard the plan and
continue as we have in the past to
use our Department of State for negotiations and conciliation, that we
arbitrate when possible as we have so
often done with Canada and other
countries, but that we and we alone
remain the judges whether we may
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safely and honorably entrust any given
case to another nation for adjudication and that we do not bind ourselves
in advance to a course which might
force us either to jeopardize the vital
interests of the United States or to
break our pledge and in so doing bring
upon ourselves the prearranged penalty; that if all the conciliation and
negotiation fail in a matter of such
supreme importance that we dare not
leave it to arbitration, that in that
case we bring whatever sacrifice may
be necessary to defend the honor, the
safety, and the welfare of our country
as in the past.
In all the wars in which this country has been engaged, negotiation,
conciliation and compromise have preceded the resort to arms, sometimes
over a period of many years. There
has never been any proposal to diminish these methods. Permit me, therefore, to point out that your assumption
that anyone might not be "ready and
willing to try to settle any or all of
these questions as they arise peaceably" does not apply.
If the Capper resolution means anything other than what has been the
long established policy of this country, it means the arbitration of all international disputes in cases when
agreement can not be reached by direct diplomatic negotiation or friendly
mediation; it means the acceptance of
the arbitral award no matter what
may be involved, no matter what the
consequences to the country, no matter what the influences that caused
the award; it means placing ourselves
at the-mercy of an arbitrator and depending upon his good faith and good
judgment, it means an absolute agreement not to wage war. That, or a
breaking of the pledge.
All this is stated concisely in paragraph I. There are no reservations,
no exceptions, no opportunity to quibble or hedge as in our previous arbi-
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tration treaties. It applies to all international disputes with the treaty
nations.
But what is an international disYou say
pute? Who shall decide?
that a nation's immigration law is so
distinctly its own that no civilized
people would think of asking another
nation to submit such a question to
international arbitrament. Permit me
to recall to you that it was the United
States which on two occasions made
exclusions the subject of international
action; one when Japan was opened
to foreigners by the American Navy,
the other when President Taft ended
our treaty of amity with Russia because certain of our citizens were prevented from entering Russia in entire
accordance with domestic Russian law.
I cannot imagine that Japan would
want better precedents than these.
The debt question must, as you say,
be re-opened sooner or later. With or
without the proposed treaties the final
settlement will be made without war.
The only difference is that under the
treaty we could, apparently, be forced
to arbitrate, when we should wish to
negotiate.
Of the Monroe Doctrine you say
that it was expressly exempted by the
statute establishing the League of Nations and that therefore it would lie
outside the scope of any agreement
for international arbitration. In your
lecture you emphasized that there
must be no exceptions, the Capper
resolution itself mentions no exceptions. Yet now the League of Nations is cited to establish an exception
of the utmost importance. Are the
proposed treaties with the five nations to come under the rules of the
League of Nations? Then why not
say so in the resolution? If the Capper resolution does not mean exactly
what it says "to adjust and settle its
international disputes by mediation,
arbitration and conciliation," then
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You say also
what does it mean?
that no one can be sure as to what
the Doctrine really means in any given
case. If that is so, then what is it
that is exempted by the League of Nations? If Japan should propose to
build an extensive port at Maedalena
Bay and to colonize a large tract of
land adjacent to it under a perfectly
legal treaty with Mexico, both of these
nations being sovereign states and
competent to make such a treaty, who
would decide whether this would fall
within the limits of the Monroe Doctrine?
The League of Nations, the
World Court, an Arbitrator, or we?
And if any but the last, then would
we relinquish the right to say that we
will prevent this even at the cost of
war?
In paragraph II there is ambiguity
in the words "without having done
so". Paragraph I unequivocably eliminates war as between the treaty powers, substituting arbitration and the
like. Paragraph II, however, defines
an aggressor not as one which begins
hostilities, but as one which begins
hostilities without having submitted
to arbitration, leaving the possible inference that hostilities might be begun
thereafter-a palpable contradiction;
yet a meaning which I know to have
been taken by some.
Together, no doubt, with many thousands of others, I hoped, as I had
hoped before, that we might now have
a proposal that would lead us forward,
only to be again disillusioned, to find
again something which upon even cursory examination discloses many contradictions and a probability of bringing nearer rather than of distancing
that which it seeks to avoid, something whose uncharted path leads to a
stupendous gamble of which the stake
is the happiness, the greatness, the
power of the people of the United
States, something which every son of
America who loves his country should
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fight to the uttermost of his power.
Please accept my best wishes for
this New Year both personally and as
the honored President of our famous
Alma Mater.
Sincerely yours,
(Signed) H. H. WOLFF.
HHW/M

CONCLUDING COMMENTS BY
MR. WOLFFNo further communication has been
received from Dr. Butler. It seems regrettable that Dr. Butler lacked time
or inclination to explain the apparent
contradictions and to elucidate how
the proposed treaties would tend to
avoid war. On the one hand he tells
us that all international disputes without exception must be so subject to
arbitration and the resolution itself
clearly states the same. On the other
hand he writes that disputes arising
under the Monroe Doctrine are excepted.
May these therefore be
handled in the old fashioned way with
threats of force when necessary? But
he tells me that it is uncertain what
comes under the Monroe Doctrine.
Some nations might therefore exclude
what we include. Is not this in itself
a new and very promising source of
disputes and likely to produc2 that
very psychology which our pacifists
so justly decry?
Dr. Butler excludes, as being domestic, such questions as the tariff and
our immigration laws. Yet economic
necessities and national affronts have
been among the most prolific causes
of war, and Dr. Shotwell, his coadjutor, publicly proclaims our tariff as a
most probable cause of war with
Japan.
The supporters of.the Capper resolution, as do pacifists generally, tell us
that we must make further treaties to
avoid war or face the doom of civilization. Yet, when we ask them specifically to. state what type of serious
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questions should be added to the list
of those that are now customarily negotiated and arbitrated, they immediately exclude all that we may name,
or they avoid the issue with generalities, or they decline to reply. Why this
lack of candor? Is it reasonable to
believe that the supporters of this
movement go to all this trouble and
expense of sending many speakers
across the continent knowing that
nothing of consequence is to be added
to what we now do by way of arbitration? Or do they wish by denial and
silence to cover the inclusion of such
questions as they are certain that the
people of the United States would
never knowingly allow to be arbitrated? Or do they wish surreptitiously
to put us in a position where we are
at the mercy and dependent upon the
goodwill of other nations?
Or are
they actually trying to produce a formula by which both sides concede
everything while each retains freedom with regard to its particular
needs, by which both sides agree not
to wage war under any circumstances,
yet each remains free to wage war in
all matters sufficiently important to
cause war?
Which of these explanations is the
correct one? Or is there some other?
H. H. WOLFF.

Lawyers in Maryland Paid

$5 Each
In 1810 Martin Luther was stricken
with paralysis, and every lawyer in
the State was compelled by legislative
act to pay a yearly license fee of $5.00
for his support. He died in 1826.

Ben Butler's Funeral
When Senator Geo. F. Hoar was asked if he was going to attend Butler's
funeral, he replied:
"No, but I approve of it."
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Why Our Government And Our Constitution?
By

m

CARLE WflITEHEAD

ARTIAL Law in Colorado,"

by my good friend Frazer
Arnold in
the February
RECORD, suggests the above question.
Resident citizens of the United
States and of Colorado have been arrested and confined for weeks without
warrant, charge (formal or informal),
trial or hearing of any nature.
Officers, whose only business in the
vicinity was to maintain order, have
attended meetings and listened to
speeches (without interruption because
there was apparently no legal reason
nor excuse to interrupt) and thereafter, in absence of disorder, or threat
or suspicion thereof, have arrested and
confined the speakers (for what reason
was not stated but very apparently to
prevent further speaking because the
speakers were publicly offered their release on condition that they refrained
from speaking).
Persons who were simply directing
distribution of food and clothing to
men, women and children have been
arrested and confined
(or spirited
away) in like manner without charge
or warrant.
Many other infringements
rights occurred.

of

civil

All this has happened while the
courts have been open and functioning
as usual for the prosecution of law violators.
Brother Arnold

presents a brief in

justification of such a state of affairs.
His argument is based on what I
believe to be an utter misconception
(all too prevalent) of those principles
and objects for which this union, and
governments both national and state,
were created and which constitute the
principal (if not the only) reason for

of the Denver Bar

the continued existence of these or any
government.
Taking that misconception as a
premise, his conclusions may or may
not be correct. I consider the questions raised and suggested by the
premise of so much more importance
than the arguments and conclusions
based thereon that I shall deal only
with those parts of the article which,
to me, clearly show the error of the
premise and therefore, the immateriality of the arguments and conclusions.
I shall try to confine myself to excerpts which fairly set forth the premise-the point of view-from which
Mr. Arnold starts.
He says: "The primary duty of the
state is self-defense and self-preservation."
One respectable expounder of the
law apparently has a different idea,
"For (says he) the principal aim of
society is to protect individuals in the
enjoyment of those absolute rights
which are vested in them by the immutable laws of nature."
(Cooley's
Blackstone, Book 1, page 124.)
A document which has been charged
with American parentage and with
having something to do with Americanism (of the true, not percentage,
type) states "That to secure these
rights (life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness, among others) governments
are instituted among men * * * (and)

whenever any government becomes destructive of these ends it is the right
of the people to alter or abolish it."
(I chance the omission of citation notwithstanding the apparent common unawareness of such a document.)
"This country with its institutions
belongs to the people who inhabit it.
Whenever they shall grow weary of
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the existing government they shall exercise their constitutional right of
amendment or their revolutionary
right to dismember or overthrow it."
(Lincoln's Inaugural Address, March
4, 1861.)
A few years later the Supreme Court
of the United States said that "A country, preserved at the sacrifice of all
the cardinal principles of liberty, is
not worth the cost of preservation."
(Ex-parte Milligan, 71 U. S. 107 at
126.)
I submit that there is very respectable precedent for asserting that the
primary duty of a state is not selfpreservation but is preservation of the
natural rights of the individual.
Mr. Arnold says that "The error into
which enthusiasts for the civil guaranties fall is that they ignore other
articles of the fundamental law of
equal dignity. There are more things
in a constitution than a bill of rights.
All constitutional provisions must be
construed together and harmonized. A
workable government could be established without a bill of rights."
Very true, a workable government
could be established without a written
bill of rights but the constitution of
the United States could not have been
ratified without the assurance of the
adoption o-f the bill of rights and even
with that assurance, it took very
smooth political work and even trickery to accomplish it. Beveridge brings
this out vefy clearly in his "Life of
Marshall."
If the federal constitution was ratified only on the assurance of a bill of
rights, then the bill of rights became,
in substance and in fact (even if not
chronologically) a condition precedent
to the constitution and, therefore, the
provisions of the bill of rights are not
"to be construed together and harmonized" with the provisions of the constitution, but are prior and superior to,
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and are limitations upon, the constitution itself.
Moreover, the primary and fundamental American document is, not the
constitution but the Declaration of Independence, which was made by and
in the name of the United States of
America and declared those inalienable
and natural rights and principles because of the violation of which our
forefathers became revolutionists and
for the preservation and protection of
was originally
which this union
formed. Twelve years later a "more
perfect union"-form of governmenta new instrument-was provided by
the constitution for the purpose of better accomplishing this preservation
and protection. The bill of rights was
adopted in order to reaffirm (and in
part specify) those rights and principles of the Declaration of Independence and to make sure that the newly
provided instrument of preservation
and protection should not be subverted
into an instrument of limitation or
destruction of those rights and principles.
Some may say that these remarks,
pertinent to a government of delegated
and limited powers, are not pertinent
to the government of a state which is
not so limited.
Mr. Arnold shows this to be his point
of view when he says that the Colorado bill of rights in providing "that
no law shall be passed impairing the
freedom of speech * * * imposes a lim-

itation on the legislative and not on
the executive department" and he concludes that the executive may impair
freedom of speech.
In a debate for points this statement
could be disposed of (a) by reading
further, in the same sentence of this
guaranty, that "Every person shall be
free to speak, write or publish whatever he will on any subject," a broad
all-inclusive guaranty, clearly not limited to any one department of govern-
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ment, and (b) by pointing out that
the executive is, what the term implies,
an officer to execute the laws, not to
substitute himself or his judgment
Executive power to do a
therefor.
thing which the legislature itself has
no power to do or to provide for by
law, is unthinkable.
Ex-parte Milligan (supra) involved
a trial by a military commission the
acts of which commission were sought
to be justified. On this point the United States Supreme Court said "They
cannot justify on the mandate of the
president; because he is controlled by
law, and has his appropriate sphere of
duty, which is to execute, not to make,
the laws."
Moreover, when the state follows the
example of the union in attaching a
similar bill of rights to its constitution, the natural conclusion is that it
intends that bill of rights to be a similar reaffirmance of and to provide similar broad and substantial preservation and protection for the inalienable
and natural rights and principles of
the Declaration of Independence.
While this statement of Mr. Arnold
might be disposed of in the above manner, its real importance lies in the
fact that though it expressly relates
only to the subject of freedom of
speech, it, in substance, clearly shows
the error in Mr. Arnold's premisehis misconception of the purpose and
objects, and justification for the continued existence of, any and all government-his assumption that the
state constitution and bill of rights
are the source and origin of the rights
of individuals and that there are no
natural and inalienable rights which
a state government is bound to respect.
The rights and principles enunciated
in the Declaration of Independence
were already established and "self evident" as therein stated. If that document added anything new it was the
statement that governments derive
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"their just powers from the consent of
the governed." Section 1 of the Colorado Bill of Rights expressly adopts
this principle and Section 3 says "That
all persons (not simply citizens) have
certain natural, essential and inalienable rights," etc. An inalienable right
is one which cannot be transferred to
or taken away by anyone-even the
state.
Cooley's Constitutional Limitations,
Eighth Edition, page 876, quotes from
the freedom of speech clauses of the
bills of rights from forty or more of
the states and then, at page 880, says
"It is to be observed of these several
provisions, that they recognize certain
rights as now existing, and seek to
protect and perpetuate them, by declaring that they shall not be abridged or
that they shall remain inviolate. They
do not assume to create new rights,
but their purpose is to protect the citizen in the enjoyment of those already
possessed."
While this is said of the freedom of
speech clauses, it very obviously relates to the natural, fundamental, inalienable rights of the individual in
general as well as to the right of freedom of speech.
In his "Suggestions for the Study of
the Law," Cooley's Blackstone, Vol. 1,
page XI, Cooley says: "But in all our
inquiries concerning what the law is,
and how the written constitution affects the rights of individuals, we are
in danger of being led to false conclusions if we do not keep in mind the
primary and fundamental fact that
'written constitutions sanctify and confirm great principles, but the latter
are prior in existence to the former.'
Those instruments have for one of
their chief ends the protection of the
rights of minorities: they seek the establishment of a government of laws
which shall be restrained in its operation within the proper sphere of government, and shall protect the pre-existent rights, not take them away."
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And Blackstone himself says "And
therefore the principal view of human
law is, or ought always to be,- to explain, protect and enforce such rights
as are absolute." (Cooley's Blackstone,
Vol. 1, page 124.)
When any government becomes so
weak and inefficient that it cannot accomplish the primary purpose of its
organization-the protection of the
natural, inalienable individual rights
of its citizens-it has no right to convert itself into an instrument for the
suppression of the exercise of those
rights and for its self-preservation. Its
justification for existence has ceased.
It becomes the "right of the people to
alter or abolish it." "It is their right
-it
is their duty-to throw off such
government and to provide new guards
for their future security" for "A country, preserved at the sacrifice of all the
cardinal principles of liberty, is not
worth the cost of preservation."
I shall not go into a discussion of the
writ of habeas corpus and the suspension thereof. Since Mr. Arnold delivered his address, Judge Symes has
handled that question in a very effective and wholesome manner. I shall
content myself with adding one quotation from "An Old Master."
"Of great importance to the public
is the preservation of this personal
liberty; for ifonce it were left in the
power of any, the highest, magistrate
to imprison arbitrarily Whomever he
or his officers thought proper, (as in
France it is daily practiced by the
crown,) there would soon be an end
of all other rights and immunities.
Some have thought that unjust attacks, even upon life or property, at
the arbitrary will ol the migistrate.
a re less dangerous to the co nniunwealth than such as are made up'on
the personal liberty of the subjcct.,
To bereave a man of life, or by violence to confiscate his estate, without
accusation or trial, would be so gross
and notorious an act of des-pouism,
--s must at once convey the alarm of
tyranny throughout the whole lRngdom; tut confinement of the person.
ly secretly hurrying him to gaol,
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wherc his sufferings are unknowv,, or
forgotten, is a less public, a less
striking, and therefore a more dangerous engine of arbitrary qovernrmcnt. And yet sometimes, when the
state is in real danger, even this
may be a necessary measure. But
the happiness of our constitution is,
that it is not left to the executive
power to determine when the dang,'r
of the state is so great as to render
this measure expedient; for it is the
parliament only, or legislative power. that, whenever it sees proper,
can authorize the crown, by suspending the habeas corpus act for a .;hort
and limited time, to imprison suspected persons without giving any
reason for so doing." (1 Cooley's
Blackstone, p. 135.)
Are we in Colorado in 1928 to have
less protection for our personal liberty
than the Englishman had nearly two
centuries ago?
Due process of law is a subject too
large for full discussion here. One of
Mr. Arnold's conclusions is that "Any
measures they (the military officials)
in good faith adopt are due process of
law."
The spirit and substance of that conclusion appear to me to be very different from the spirit and substance of
the following from the United States
Supreme Court in Fayerweather vs.
Ritch, 195 U. S. 276, at 298, which quotation I submit as food for thought on
this subject: "But a state may not, by
any of its agencies, disregard the prohibitions of the. Fourteenth Amendment. Its judicial authorities may
keep within the letter of the statute
prescribing forms of procedure in the
courts, and give the parties interested
the fullest opportunity to be heard,
and yet it might be that its final action
would be inconsistent with that amendment. In determining what is due
process of law regard must be had to
substance, not to form. This Court
referring to the Fourteenth Amendment has said, 'Can a state make anything due process of law which, by its
own legislation it chooses to declare
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such? To affirm this is to hold that
the prohibition to the state is of no
avail, or has no application where the
invasion of private rights is effected
under the forms of state legislation.'
(Davidson vs. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97,
102.) The same question could be propounded and the same answer should
be made in reference to judicial proceedings inconsistent with due process
of law."
If this be true of legislative enactment and of judicial proceeding, should
it still be argued that "Any measures
which they (military officials) in good
faith adopt are due process of law"?
Our great men have learned and
have freely acknowledged the fundamental error, the futility, the absolute
danger of repressive measures whether
legislative, judicial or executive.
The late Senator Beveridge in an
address to the American Bar Association at the annual meeting in 1920, entitled "The Assault Upon American
Fundamentals" says:
"The chief argument for the policy
of repression is today what it always
has been, that 'An ounce of prevention
is worth a pound of cure.' Yet on precisely that theory, the British monarchy prohibited .the publishing of
books and writings except those which
were approved and licensed by august
agents of the royal government. It
was this very idea which Milton denounced and refuted in that historic
argument for the Freedom of the
Press, his immortal Areopagitica. It
is this exact doctrine that was practiced by every autocracy from the beginning of time.
"It cannot be too often repeated that
not only has the repressive policy been
ineffective in preventing the spread of
proscribed ideas, but, on the contrary,
it has given those ideas wings of fire;
and that, moreover, by compelling the
advocates of those ideas to work in secret instead of the open, the repressive

policy has made dangerous opinions
which otherwise were harmless. Punishment for preaching religious, economic, social or political beliefs clothes
the preacher with the attractive garments of martyrdom. Moreover the
repressive policy arouses the curiosity
and sympathy of those who, but for
the repression, might have been indifferent or hostile. It is merely human
nature to inquire what the doctrine
is, for advocating which men are punished; and those who are thus led to
investigate proscribed ideas to which
they might otherwise have paid no attention whatever, too often listen or
read with favoring eye or ear. That is
the reason for the well known fact that
radical leaders rejoice in repression."
Repressive measures are born of
fear, usually unfounded. The discussion of repressive measures relates to
the question of freedom of speech more
often than to other natural, individual
rights because that right is probably
more often impaired. The remarks as
to repression of freedom of speech apply, however, with substantially equal
force, to all measures for the repression of the exercise of the natural
rights of the individual. For this reason I trust that my quotations which
mention the right of freedom of speech
will not be misunderstood as being
limited simply to that right. o
Benjamin Franklin said "Freedom
of speech is the principal pillar of free
government; when this support is
taken away the constitution of free society is dissolved and tyranny is erected on its ruins. Those abuses of freedom of speech are the excesses of liberty. They ought to be repressed-but
to whom dare we commit the care of
doing it? An evil magistrate entrusted
with power to punish for errors, would
be armed with a weapon the most destructive and terrible. Under the pretense of pruning off the exuberant
branches, he would be apt to destroy
the tree."
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In quoting the following from an article by Dr. Frank Crane entitled
"Trembling Patriots", I do not quote
from him as an authority but for the
reason that he has in this case put
some fundamental truths in very clear
language. He says: "It needs to be
clearly understood that those trembling patriots who are so timid that
they would imprison, suppress or punish anybody who thinks that the government should be changed, are the
real manufacturers of bolshevism and
lawlessness in this country. If there
is anything worse than a lie, it is a
silly attempt to suppress it." And
again, "I do not like, any more than
the nervous policeman likes, the scarecrow-shrieking of the soured apostles
of discontent, but I like less the czaristic method of dealing with them.
Meet ideas with ideas, lies with truth,
unreason with reason and let us have
done forever with the fallacy of force."
I have made no attempt at a technical legal argument nor to answer all
of the points raised by Mr. Arnold. To
do so would, in my mind, belittle the
subject which is really involved and
to which we should all give our attention.
I believe that true Americanism is
big enough and on a sufficiently solid
foundation, to withstand all assaults
of its enemies and that its only danger
lies in the unfounded and unreasoning
fear of some of its avowed friends.
I believe that martial law in Colorado and the things that have been
done under it and in its name are the
result of such an unfounded and unreasoning fear resulting in turn from
a failure to fully appreciate the
strength and power of true Americanism.
We have boasted that this is the
land of liberty. I would like to keep
it so and I know of no more appropriate way to close this article than with
the Ode of John Hay to Liberty:
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LIBERTY
What man is there so bold that he
should say
"Thus, and thus only, would I have
the sea?"
For whether lying calm and beautiful
Clasping the earth in love, and throwing back
The smile of heaven from waves of
amethyst;
Or whether, freshened by the busy
winds,
It bears the trade and navies of the
wor]d
To ends of use or stern activity;
Or whether, lashed by tempests, it
gives way
To elemental fury, howls and roars
At all its rocky barriers, in wild lust
Of ruin drinks the blood of living
things,
And strews its wrecks o'er leagues of
desolate shore,Always it is the sea, and men bow
down
Before its vast and varied majesty.
So all in vain will timorous ones essay
To set the metes and bounds of Liberty.
For Freedom is its own eternal law;
It makes its own conditions, and in
storm
Or calm alike fulfills the unerring Will.
Let us not then despise it when it lies
Still as a sleeping lion, while a swarm
Of gnat-like evils hovers round its
head,
Nor doubt it when in mad, disjointed
times
It shakes the torch of terror, and its
cry
Shrills o'er the quaking earth, and in
the flame
Of riot and war we see its awful form
Rise by the scaffold, where the crimson
axe
Rings down its grooves the knell of
shuddering kings.
Forever in thine eyes, 0 Liberty,
Shines that high light whereby the
world is saved,
And though thou slay us, we will trust
in thee!

An Agnostic
"An agnostic is a person who knows
he knows nothing; and believes no
other person knows any more than he
does."-R. G. Ingersoll.
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Benjamin F. Butler's Examination For Admission
To The Bar

"AS

the law then stood, (1840)
if a student had slept in a
lawyer's office for three years,

claiming that he was studying law,
and his teacher would give him a certificate that he had done so, he could
be admitted to the bar as a matter of
course. But if the student had passed
any less time in a lawyer's office, he
had to be subjected to an examination
by the judge of the higher courts before he could be admitted. Mr. Smith
made an application for me to the
judge for admission upon examination,
stating that he thought I could pass
the examination. The judge appointed
an hour early that evening, at his
lodgings, for me to appear to be examined. He received me very kindly,.
and asked me when and where I graduated, and what I had done since. To
all of this I answered, saying only that
I had been attending to the law for
two years, with the exception of three
months that I had been engaged in
teaching.
He then asked me what
text-books I had read. I told him. He
said, "You have read very few textbooks". That was too true to be denied. He said that he thought I had
better read a year longer, and that he
would advise me to do so. I said I was
very much obliged to him, and thought
I had better read five years longer, but
the difficulty was I did not see how I
could get the means to do it. He said
that under the circumstances unless I
insisted, he would rather not examine
me. I said to him that it was necessary that I should be examined, if I
were to enter the profession, and if I
were not he would soon show me
wherein I was deficient, and if it would
not trouble him too much I desired the
examination. He said, "Very well",
and began a series of questions upon

the practice of the law. He supposed
I had no knowledge of this, and
thought he could easily convince me
that I ought to have some. But the
tuition that I had got from my friend,
Judge Locke, was too much for him.
That part of the law I knew better
than some gentlemen who had been in
practice for years. I remember that
among the questions he asked was
this: "If you had a deed to prove in
court where both the maker -and the
subscribing witness were dead, how
would you prove it?" I answered him
at once:
"By calling somebody who
knew the handwriting of the subscribing witness and proving his handwriting." He said to me: "Why not prove
the handwriting of the maker?" "Because the subscribing witness", was
my reply, "was called by the parties as
a sort of attestor, and, therefore, we
prove the signature of the subscribing witness and not the maker's". He
continued that kind of examination
for a long space of time. He then put
me this question: "I see you have always been in court while I have been
here holding session, apparently attending to the cases as they go on. Do
you understand the proceedings?" "I
try to do so, sir, and I think I do understand some of them at least."
"Well", he said, "we sat a little later
than usual tonight, and I observed that
you remained there until the case was
finished". "Yes, sir." "Will you state
to me, in your own way, what that
case was, and the points raised, and
the ruling of the court." I answered:
"That case was a suit brought by the
indorsee of a promissory note against
the maker. The defense was that the
maker was an infant, i. e., under twenty-one years of age, when he made it.
The answer to that was that after he
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became twenty-one years of age, when
it was presented to him he had promised to pay the note. The reply to that
was that the promise was after the indorsement, and although the note was
negotiable, it did not pass to the indorsee." He said: "You have stated
the case with cnrrectness; I so ruled."
"Yes", I said, "and directed a verdist
for the defendant". I then looked up
and said: "I thought your honor ruled
incorrectly."
He, with a kind smile,
said: "What reason, Mr. Butler, have
you for that?" I said: "Because the
note was negotiable when it was made,
anl remained so, and when the infant
)ecame oZ age, promised to pay it, it
then became a note precisely as it
would have been if it had been made
upon that day. The note was sued
upon as a negotiable note, then made,
and it was not the promise passed by
the endorsement, but the note." "That
view of the case was not put to me by
the counsel." "I observed that it was
not", said I, "and as it has been my
habit to do, I went to my office to look
for an authority which I thought I
remembered. I found it, and the exact
case has been decided, and upon the
reasons I have given." "When you go
back to your office, Mr. Butler, can you
send me up that authority?"
"No,
your honor; I am the youngest in that
office, and I have nobody to send, but
I can bring it to you if you desire."
"You will do me a great favor if you
will do so." I went home and hunted
up the authority in the "English Common Law Reports", and put in a mark,
and gave it to the clerk of the hotel
to hand to the judge. I did not sleep
much that night. I went into the court
the next morning, and after some of
the motions of court were passed upon, which was the habit in those days,
the judge called the counsel who had
tried the case the night before, and
said to them: "Upon reflection, I think
I made a mistake in the ruling I made
last night, and as whichever way I rule
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I suppose the case will go up on exceptions, it will make no difference
which way I rule except to myself. If
you will consent, I will reverse the
decision and have the jury give the
verdict for the plaintiff, no business
having intervened since."
The counsel seemed surprised, but consented.
This
comforting
thought
passed
through my mind:
"If you do not
admit me now; judge, I will tell on
you." That thought was an unworthy
one. The next thing that he said was:
"Mr, Clerk, Mr. Butler was examined
by me for admission to the bar, and
you .can administer the oath and enter
his name on the rolls. It is due him
to say that the matter of my ruling
came up in the course of his examination, and his suggestions led me to
examine
the matter
further, and
change my ruling."

He was one of the

few judges I have known who was big
enough to do such a thing as that.
From that day to the day of his death
we were fast friends. If any one should
desire to see the case, it will be found
in the 1st Metcalf Mass. R., Reed v.
Batchelder, p. 559, where the judge's
ruling was sustained by the Supreme
Court. It may enliven any legal reader to tell that another young gentleman was examined for admission some
little time after, and the morning following, he said to me:

"The judge

asked me a question last night which I
do not know whether I answered right
or not. He asked me what was an administrator de bonis non, and I told
him it was an administrator where
there was not any goods."

I said, "I

hope he won't reject you on account
of that answer, because it is generally
right in point of fact, even if wrong in
point of law."
Butler's Book, page 74 et seq.
(Reported by William J. McPherson,
of the Denver Bar, 1928)
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An Invitation
The foundation for the advancement
of the Social Sciences, of University
of Denver, extends a cordial invitation to members of the Bar to attend
the lectures to be given under its auspices by Miss Maude Royden of England.
Miss Royden has won general recognition as one of the great minds
among the women of the world. As an
author and lecturer upon subjects
dealing with society, government and
religion, she is exerting an influenc3
upon British thought probably equaled
by no other woman and surpassed by
few men.
The circumstances of birth gave her
peculiar advantages which she has
capitalized in a rare way. Born of a
family of wealth and distinction, the
daughter of Sir Thomas Royden, Miss
Royden received the finest education
England affords for women, including
study at Chiltenham Ladies' College
and Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford. She
has devoted her unique gifts of intelligence and personality to the betterment of social conditions in England
and the improvement of international
relations.
For several years Miss
Royden has preached on Sunday evenings in London to capacity audiences.
She has the reputation of being the
most eloquent woman preacher of today.
The range of Miss Royden's interests is indicated by the titles of some
of her books: "Women and the Sovereign State," "The Hour and the
Church,"
"Blessed Joan of Arc,"
"Political Christianity."
In her lectures in Denver, Miss
Royden will deal with international
issues. Admission to the lectures will
be by ticket, which may be secured
without cost by telephone or writing
to the Foundation for the Advancement of the Social Sciences, University of Denver. Her addresses will be
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given in the auditorium of East High
School at 8:30 on Wednesday, Thursday and Friday evenings, March 7, 8
and 9.

Notice
The Denver Bar Association has
gone on record as favoring the following proposed Amendment to Section
30, of Article V of the Constitution of
Colorado:
The salaries of the Governor, the
Governor's Secretary, and the Judges
of the Supreme and District Courts of
the State shall be fixed by legislative
enactment: provided, that the salaries
of said officers heretofore fixed by the
Constitution shall continue in force
until otherwise provided for by legislative enactment. No law shall extend
the term of any public officer, or increase or decrease his salary, after
his election or appointment, as fixed
by legislative enactment.
On Friday, Feb. 3, 1928 an organization meeting was held to outline the
proposed campaign in support of this
amendment. Mr. Fred Y. Holland was
designated to act as Secretary. An
urgent request is made for speakers.
All those desiring to aid in this will
please get in touch with Mr. Holland,
Phone: Main 5480.
"No Man Higher Than the Law"
"No man in this country is so high
that he is above the law. No officer of
the law may set that law in defiance
with impunity. All the officers of the
government, from the highest to the
lowest, are creatures of the law, and
are bound to obey it. It is the only
supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound
to submit to that supremacy, and to
observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives."-From opinion of
Samuel F. Miller in the Arlington
cases, 106 U. S., 106 and 196 (1882).
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Recent Trial Court
Decisions
(Editor's Note.-It is intended in each
issue of the Record to note interesting
current decisions of all local Trial Courts,
including the United States District Court,
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able, dependable and one who could
come recommended, for which we will
thank you.
Yours respectfully,
MERCHANTS CREDIT BUREAU OF

OAK CREEK.

State District Courts, the County Court,
and the Justice Courts. The co-operation
of the members of the Bar is solicited in
making this department a success. Any
attorney having knowledge of such a decision is requested to phone or mail the
title of the case to Victor Arthur Miller,
who will digest the decision for this department. The names of the Courts having no material for the current month will
be omitted, due to lack of space.)

DENVER DISTRICT COURT
DIvIsIoN IV

HON. HENRY BRAY, JUDGE
Facts: Garnishment-M o t i o n to
quash Writ and Answer of Garnishee.
Garnishee was wife of judgment debtor.
Held: Writ quashed.
Reasoning: The statutory privilege
of a man by way of immunity against
testimony on the part of his wife
against him without his consent applies to answers under oath in garAccordingly,
nishment proceedings.
the wife of a judgment debtor may
not be garnished without his consent.
International
89859.

Trust

Co. v.

Heald,

A n Opening
Denver Bar Association,
Denver, Colo.
Gentlemen:
Oak Creek, a town of approximately
1300 people, mining camps and farming district surrounding town, offers
a very good opening for a young attorney to be active in all law matters
in a district of this kind. You can refer this to some attorney whom you
know is looking for such an opening
who bears a good reputation, is reli-

Committee

for

Digesting of

Decisions of Supreme Court
of Colorado
The President of the Asscciation has
appointed the following committee for
the purpose of analyzing and digesting the decisions of the Supreme
Court of the State of Colorado for
publication in The Record:
C. Clyde Barker, Chairman
Smith Henry,
Harold B. Wagner.
It is the intention of the association
that the decisions will be digested
only after the period for filing a petition for rehearing has elapsed, or after
any such petition if filed has been
disposed of.

Laughter
"No man who has once heartily
laughed can be altogether irreclaimably bad. How much lies in laughter;
the cipher-key, wherewith we decipher
the whole man! Some men wear an
everlasting barren simper; in the smile
of others lies a cold glitter of ice; the
fewest are able to laugh, what can be
called laughing, but only sniff and titter and snigger from the throat outwards; or at best, produce some whiffing, husky cachinnation, as if they
were laughing through wool; of none
such comes good. The man who cannot laugh, is not only fit for treason,
stratagem and spoils, but his whole life
is already a treason and a stratagem."
-Thos. Carlyle.
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Surprised the Witness
Mr. Mason possessed to a marked degree the instinct for the weak point.
He was once cross-examining a witness
who had previously testified to having
heard Mr. Mason's client make a certain statement, and it was upon the
establishment of that statement that
the adversary's case was based. Mr..
Mason led the witness around to this
statement, and again it was repeated
verbatim. Then, without warning, he
walked to the stand, and pointing
straight at the witness, said, in his
high impassioned voice:
"Let's see
that paper you have in your waistcoat
pocket".
Taken completely by surprise, the
witness mechanically took the paper
from the pocket indicated and handed
it to Mr. Mason. The lawyer slowly
read the exact words of the witness in
regard to the statement, and called attention to the fact that they were in
the hand writing of the lawyer on the
other side. "Mr. Mason, how under
the sun did you know that paper was
there?" asked a brother lawyer. "Well",
replied Mr. Mason, "I thought he gave
that part of his testimony more as if
he'd heard it, and I noticed every time
he repeated it he put his hand to his
waistcoat pocket, and then let it fall
again when he got through".-Jeremiah Mason 1768-18118 N. H.

Childhood's Laughter
"Strike with hand of fire, weird musician, thy harp, strung with Apollo's
golden hair; fill the vast cathedral
aisles with symphonies sweet and dim,
deft toucher of the organ keys; blow,
bugler, blow, until thy silver notes do
touch the skies, with moonlit waves,
and charm the lover's wandering on
the vine-clad hills; but know your
sweetest strains are discords all compared with childhood's happy laugh,
the laughter that fills the eyes with

light and every heart with joy; oh,
rippling river of life, thou art the
blessed boundary line between the
beasts and man, and every wayward
wave of thine doth drown some fiend
of care; oh, laughter, divine daughter
of joy, make dimples enough in the
cheeks of the world to catch and hold
and glorify all the tears of grief."R. G. Ingersoll.

The State of Delaware
"And, Mr. President, this is the State
(Kansas) that has been assailed in the
chamber by a man who represents in
part-in part, Mr. President-a State
which has two counties when the tide
is up and three when the tide is down."
-John J. Ingalls in reply to Senator
Salisbury, of Delaware, who had attacked Kansas, in the U. S. Senate.

Not Guilty of Larceny
"Prisoner, a few minutes ago you
said you were a thief. Now the jury
say you are la 4ar. Consequently you
are discharged."-Judge Henry Hawkins, (Baron Brampton) of England,
to a prisoner, who had pleaded 'guilty'
to larceny, and then withdrew his plea,
and was tried and found 'not guilty'.Judge John B. Gibson (1780-1853).
How to Make a Great Lawyer
"The best thing to make a great lawyer is great poverty."-Lord Mansfield.
Every Stenographic Service
Promptly 4ttended to at 4ny Time

Reitler and Woodman
I

Certified Shorthand ReportersNOTARIES PUBLIC
Phone Champa 2260
Suite 416 Empire Bldg.
. Denver, Colo.

EDWARD WHITLEY
Treasurer

CHAS. H. SCOTT
President

THE RECORD ABSTRACT COMPANY
725 Eighteenth Street
DENVER

Complete Abstracts of Title
To all Real Estate in

DENVER
ADAMS
and

ARAPAHOE COUNTIES

TELEPHONES MAIN 1208 AND

1209

The
National Tax and Mortgage
Company
616-618 Eighteenth Street
is now owner of

The Walker Investment Company

By reason of this merger, we are qualified to offer some real
bargains in FARM LANDS, as well as in VACANT LOTS
and IMPROVED PROPERTIES in the city of Denver.

We are also agents for

The London Underwriters Corporation
and are prepared to promptly and efficiently serve your needs in

All Lines of Insurance

PHONE US AT MAIN 8659
WE WILL SERVE YOU WELL
R. D. WILLIAMSON. President

J. T. JONES, Vice President

5 good Client
MEMBERS of the Bar acting as attorneys

for estates in cases where a bank is executor or administrator find a financial institution to be a good client.
The bank's officers are experienced, under-

stand the business in hand, are always available and appreciate the importance of legal
service. Matters of accounting, collecions,
and other business details of which counsel
are glad to be relieved are attended to by
the bank. The combination of a good lawyer and an experienced trust department
produces the best possible administration.
At each of the undersigned banks it is an
established policy that the attorney who
draws the will designating the bank in a
fiduciary capacity shall be chosen as attorney for the estate.
THE AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK
THE COLORADO NATIONAL BANK
THE DENVER NATIONAL BANK
THE INTERNATIONAL TRUST COMPANY
THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL BANK
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